IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

A.B. and K.V. v. Romania (Application no. 17816/21)

WRITTEN COMMENTS

Submitted jointly by

AIRE Centre
ILGA-Europe

30 March 2022
These observations are submitted on behalf of the AIRE Centre (“Advice on Individual Rights in Europe”) and the European Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (“ILGA-Europe”). The submissions will address the following four points:

i. The nexus between European Union (EU) law, including case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), especially in light of Article 53 of the latter;

ii. The principle of equal rights for same-sex families in the European Union with respect to the exercise of the right to freedom of movement, in light of the CJEU’s ruling in Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Ministerul Afacerilor Interne Others;

iii. Application of Article 12 of the Convention in cases concerning freedom of movement and residence rights under the EU law, where the status of “spouses” cannot be downgraded to another status in light of the points (i) and (ii) above; and

iv. The lack of any legal protection for same-sex families in selected Member States in light of this Court’s jurisprudence on the legal protection of such families.

I. The nexus between EU law, including case law of the CJEU, and the ECHR, especially in light of Article 53 of the latter

1. In the absence of EU accession to the ECHR, it is incumbent on the CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to ensure that, so far as possible, the relationship between EU law, including the CJEU’s case law, and the ECHR, including the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, is one of harmony, promoting the collective understanding and enforcement of human rights. Without such a concerted effort on the part of the two Courts, there is a risk of fragmentation of EU/ECHR law, and of a lowering of standards with respect to human rights protection in Europe and beyond. The relationship between the two systems and the two Courts must be able to ensure a stable level of human rights protection, as well as legal certainty for applicants and, ideally, consistency in their respective case law over time, so long as such harmonization aims to enhance human rights protection, as opposed to lowering standards to a minimum common denominator.

2. Beyond merely informal dialogue between the two Courts, the current system provides two main responses to the challenge of ensuring that EU/ECHR law is not excessively fragmented or incoherent. Firstly, through Articles 53 ECHR and 52(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (“CFR”). Secondly, through the ECtHR’s critical role in scrutinising compliance with the Convention by EU Member States when applying EU law.

---

1 Callewaert, Johan. “Do we still need article 6 (2) TEU? Considerations on the absence of EU accession to the ECHR and its consequences.” Common Market Law Review 55, no. 6 (2018). It must also be recalled that in Judgement of 30 June 2005, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, (Application no. 45036/98), 150, the Strasbourg Court recognised “the growing importance of international cooperation and of the consequent need to secure the proper functioning of international organisations”.


3 Article 53 ECHR provides that, “Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a party.” Article 52(3) CFR provides that, “In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.”
In relation to the latter, in cases where the CJEU has made a preliminary ruling on a question that comes within the scope of the ECHR by virtue of engaging one or more Convention rights, and where an EU Member State has failed to properly give effect to that preliminary ruling once the case is returned to the referring Member State court, the ECtHR is, in effect, the “court of last resort” for the applicant seeking to exercise the relevant Convention right in the context of the EU Member State’s purported application of relevant EU law.

3. Meanwhile, with regard to the ECtHR’s critical role in scrutinising EU Member States’ compliance with the Convention when applying EU law, it is clear that EU law protection can be – and has on occasion been – raised above the Convention level. Under the EU law, Article 52(3) CFR explicitly provides for this possibility, as does Article 53 ECHR within the Convention system. Moreover, under Article 53 ECHR, the ECtHR must ensure that High Contracting Parties to the Convention do not use the Convention to justify human rights violations or undermine greater standards of human rights protection guaranteed under their domestic laws or any other international law human rights law obligation by which the same States are bound.

4. Article 53 ECHR may also expand the “interpretative latitude” of the Strasbourg Court vis-à-vis the Convention, fostering cross-fertilisation and synergy between parallel legal orders, by enabling and encouraging the ECtHR to view international law – and, therefore, where applicable, also EU law – in an open-minded way, ensuring compliance with higher human rights standards guaranteed under that body of law. In this sense, Article 53 is not only a substantive right, but also an optimising provision that aims to maximise the protection of human rights beyond the confines of other provisions. This important role accorded to Article 53 is accepted by the Court both explicitly, when it references Article 53, but also, more often, implicitly, when the principles of Article 53 are applied without reference, for example, where the Court is informed by a jurisprudential precedent of CJEU where the CJEU has articulated a more expansive standard of protection in relation to specific overlapping rights.

5. This, of course, is not to say that the scope of protection afforded by the Convention automatically, and without further interpretation, aligns with the highest available standard under international law binding the parties to the Convention. Moreover, as the Concurring Opinion of Judge Wojtyczek in National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v. the United Kingdom notes, the simple fact that there may be situations in which different instruments may provide a higher level of protection than the Convention is not, in and of itself, automatically indicative of a purported fragmentation or incoherence of international human rights law – or, in this case, of a purported incoherence between the ECHR and

---

4 For example, with respect to access to classified information in court files (see e.g. the CJEU judgment of 4 June 2013, C-300/11, ZZ, EU:C:2013:363 and the ECtHR judgment of 19 Sept. 2017, Regner v. the Czech Republic, Appl. No. 35289/11) or the scope of freedom of religion (see e.g. the CJEU judgment of 5 September 2012 in the joined Cases C-71 & 99/11, Y and Z, EU:C:2012:518 and the ECtHR judgement of 19 December 2017 in A. v. Switzerland, Appl. No. 60342/16) or the protection of personal data (see infra FN 1.).

5 Judgement of 23 July, 2013, Suso Musa v. Malta, Application no. 42337/12, 97.

6 Judgement of 20 October, 2016, Muršić v. Croatia, Application no. 7334/13, 22; and Judgement of 21 June 2016, L-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland, Application no. 5809/08, 71. Indeed, the ECtHR famously made use of such interpretative latitude, taking inspiration from the CJEU (in the CJEU judgement of 30 April 1996, C-13/94), in the ECtHR judgement of 11 July 2002, Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 28957/95.

7 Ibid. (e.g.) judgment of 19 Sept. 2017, Regner v. the Czech Republic, Application no. 35289/11 or judgement of 11 July 2002, Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 28957/95.

8 Judgement of 8 April 2014, National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 31045/10, concurring opinion of Judge Wojtyczek, 3.
EU law. Furthermore, the Convention provides a floor guaranteeing, in the words of Judge Wojtyczek, “a minimum standard for a limited catalogue of rights”, and not a “ceiling” of human rights protection.

6. Nevertheless, where a High Contracting Party (and an EU Member State) is refusing to comply with explicit and unambiguous laws by which it is bound (under its own legal system through the application of EU law) guaranteeing certain human rights protections, it is clear from Article 53 ECHR that the Convention will not afford the relevant High Contracting Party with any justification for such non-compliance. In cases where EU law protection has been raised above the Convention level, if the Strasbourg Court were to allow Member States to take advantage of lower standards of protection under the ECHR and its jurisprudence and, in so doing, subvert the appropriate enforcement of human rights guarantees under the EU legal order, it would undermine its long-established case-law according to which the Convention is to be interpreted as a living instrument for the protection of human rights, including, as much as possible, in a manner consistent with other relevant international law obligations. Ultimately, a question of fragmentation, incoherence and, indeed, lack of legal certainty would arise if the Strasbourg Court were to maintain a legal limbo on whether or not a Member State is complying with its Convention obligations in circumstances where that Member State is violating EU law rights that clearly and directly overlap with Convention rights.

7. The interveners submit that the Strasbourg Court can optimally supervise a Contracting Party’s compliance with Article 53 of the ECHR by adopting an approach that guarantees at least the protection required under the applicable EU law, and that such an approach is consistent with the Convention, its case law and the letter and the spirit of Article 53.

II. The principle of equal rights for same-sex families in the European Union with respect to the exercise of the right to freedom of movement, in light of the CJEU’s ruling in Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Ministerul Afacerilor Interne

8. With the ruling in Coman and Others, the CJEU made an unequivocal interpretation that the term ‘spouse’ within the meaning of Directive 2004/38 was gender neutral. It could therefore cover the same-sex spouse of the Union citizens concerned. It followed that a Member State cannot rely on its national law as justification for refusing to recognise in its territory a marriage concluded by that national with a Union citizen of the same sex in another Member State, in accordance with the law of that State, for the sole purpose of granting a derived right of residence to a third-country national.

9. Implicitly, the CJEU explained that obstacles to free movement rights that emerge from a refusal to grant family reunification rights to same-sex spouses can under no

---

9 Ibid.
10 Supra note 5.
11 Bayatyan v Armenia, no. 23459/03, 7 July 2011, para. 102.
12 Supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
14 Ibid, para. 35.
15 Ibidem.
circumstances be justified. EU law requires that the exercise of the primary and fundamental right to move and reside freely in another Member State can under no circumstances lead to the loss by a Union citizen of the marital status (s)he has acquired in the Member State from which (s)he moves, at least for the purposes of granting EU family reunification rights.

10. Consequently, the Interveners also submit that, to allow Member States to grant or refuse entry into and residence in their territory to a third-country national whose marriage to a Union citizen was concluded in another Member State in accordance with the law of that State, whether or not national law allows same-sex marriage, would result in limitations of the freedom of movement of Union citizens. This equally applies to those EU citizens who have already made use of that freedom from one Member State to another. Such a situation would be at odds with EU law.

11. When a Union citizen has exercised their freedom of movement by taking up residence in a Member State, other than that of which (s)he is a national, Article 21(1) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) must be interpreted as precluding the competent authorities of the Member State, of which the Union citizen is a national, from refusing to grant their third-country national spouse a right of residence in the territory of that Member State on the ground that the law of that Member State does not recognise same-sex marriage for the purposes of residence in that Member State.

12. The CJEU did not impose on all the Member States an obligation to introduce either same-sex marriage or partnership. It did, however, demand recognition of the status attached to same-sex marriage in the Member States where this institution exists, and in Member States where it is legally unknown, to ensure that free movement can be enjoyed without discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation across the territory of the Union. Particularly important in this regard is the outright dismissal of the esoteric defence of moral choices to discriminate without any critical scrutiny, clothed by the terminology of “constitutional identity”, which has played a questionable role in the line of case law regarding the right to a name. The incongruity of the “protection of the traditional family” argument, which lies at the core of “identity” considerations, was outlined by AG Wathelet, as well as by AG Jääskinen in his Opinion in Römer, and, given its obvious clarity. Failure to take it into account would put the ECtHR in contrast with clear EU law.

13. Consequently, the Interveners submit that Coman and Others transcends the narrow paradigm of discrimination within employment schemes of Directive 2004/38 and extends it to a unified approach, clearly establishing basic protections of free movement of persons in the internal market for same-sex couples. Additionally, from the moment that a Member State recognises the same sex marriage for one purpose (i.e., admission and residence in its territory), it is anomalous to refuse to treat the couple as married for other legal purposes, such

---

16 Ibid, paras. 44-46.
18 Ibid, para. 37.
19 Ibid, para. 38.
20 Article 4(2) TEU.
as tax related advantages and employment related benefits, particularly in light of EU anti-discrimination law applicable in this context.\textsuperscript{23}

III. Application of Article 12 of the Convention in cases concerning freedom of movement and residence rights under the EU law, where the status of “spouses” cannot be downgraded to another status in light of the points (i) and (ii) above

14. The Court found in its judgment of \textit{Schalk and Kopf v. Austria},\textsuperscript{24} that “same-sex couples are just as capable as different-sex couples of entering into stable committed relationships”. The Court also stated that same-sex couples are “in a relevantly similar situation to a different-sex couple as regards their need for legal recognition and protection of their relationship”,\textsuperscript{25} and have “the same needs in terms of mutual support and assistance as different-sex couples”.\textsuperscript{26}

15. However, despite this similarity, without the possibility to access legal recognition in any legal framework, same-sex couples are effectively denied rights that are afforded to different-sex partners with such status or spouses and are thus denied the full spectrum of rights guaranteed through Article 8 of the Convention. For instance, same-sex partners may be denied access to the partner’s health insurance, family allowances or other employer’s benefits, favourable taxation rules, etc. Further, the Court confirmed in the \textit{Oliari} judgment that attempting to access these rights and benefits through court proceedings, administrative declarations, notarial acts and private contracts are not only likely to “lack in content”, in so far as not all needs of same-sex couples are covered, but that they also are not “sufficiently stable” and represent a “not-insignificant hindrance to the applicants' efforts to obtain respect for their private and family life.”

16. This means that many aspects of the right to family life can only be accessed in an effective and concrete manner if a couple or a family are recognised as such by the State. The Interveners thus contend that providing access to a legal framework for recognition by the State is required to ensure respect for the rights to family life covered by Article 8.

17. This was confirmed by the Court, which found in 2015 in the case of \textit{Oliari v. Italy} and reaffirmed in 2021 in \textit{Fedotova v. Russia},\textsuperscript{27} that High Contracting Parties have a positive obligation to provide a means for same-sex couples to obtain legal recognition of their relationships.\textsuperscript{28} Similarly, in June 2018, the CJEU found in the \textit{Coman v. Romania} case that the private and family life of same-sex couples is protected under Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and that EU Member States have an obligation to recognise same-sex marriages or partnerships contracted abroad for the purpose of deriving a residency right for a third country national and thus preserving the freedom of movement of EU citizens. Moreover, in previous cases dealing with aspects of the right to respect for family life, the Court has consistently found no valid justification to deny a


\textsuperscript{24} ECHRR, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, App no. 30141/04, 24 June 2010.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, para. 99.

\textsuperscript{26} Vallianatos, op. cit., para. 81.

\textsuperscript{27} Fedotova v. Russia, App no. 40792/10, 13 July 2021.

\textsuperscript{28} Oliari and others v. Italy, op. cit., paras. 174 and 185; Fedotova v. Russia, op. cit., paras 49-56.
specific right to same-sex couples when it is available to different-sex couples in the same situation.\textsuperscript{29}

The Court has repeatedly recognised that the Convention is a living instrument, which should be interpreted in light of present-day conditions.\textsuperscript{30} The interveners invite the Court to place interpretation of Article 12 in light of the major changes in society surrounding the rights of persons in same-sex relationships and their families,\textsuperscript{31} and the trend in the recognition of same-sex relationships both in Europe\textsuperscript{32} and internationally.\textsuperscript{33}

18. While this Court has stated that it cannot derive rights from provisions of the Convention that were not included at the outset,\textsuperscript{34} the Interveners submit that the present limited interpretation of Article 12 interferes with the fundamental rights of persons in same-sex relationships. Moreover, the right to legal recognition under Article 12 of the Convention is not only a stand-alone right, but it is also the only way through which same-sex couples can obtain protection from the State on most of their rights to family life under Article 8.

IV. The lack of any legal protection for same-sex families in selected Member States in light of this Court’s jurisprudence on the legal protection of such families

19. This Court has established that, “in defining the meaning of terms and notions in the text of the Convention, [it] can and must take into account elements of international law other than the Convention, the interpretation of such elements by competent organs, and the practice of European States reflecting their common values. The consensus emerging from specialised international instruments and from the practice of Contracting States [emphasis added] may constitute a relevant consideration for the Court when it interprets the provisions of the Convention in specific cases.”\textsuperscript{35}

20. The rights under the Convention are not applied in a vacuum,\textsuperscript{36} but fall to be interpreted in light of, and in harmony with, other international law standards and obligations,\textsuperscript{37} including under treaty and customary international law.\textsuperscript{38}

21. In relation to protection of same-sex families and recognition of same-sex couples, the 27 EU Member States can be divided into three groups:

\textsuperscript{30} Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, No. 30141/04 (24 June 2010), para. 57; E.B v. France, No. 43546/02 (22 January 2008), para. 92.
\textsuperscript{31} Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, No. 30141/04 (24 June 2010), paras. 54, 55.
\textsuperscript{34} Johnston and Others v. Ireland, [18 December 1986, para. 53, Series A no. 112].
\textsuperscript{35} ECHR, Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, 12 November 2008, Application No. 34503/97, para. 85.
\textsuperscript{36} Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, judgment, 12 May 2005, para. 163.
\textsuperscript{37} Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97, judgment, 12 November 2008, para. 67; Al-Adsani v. the UK [GC], no. 35763/97, judgment, 21 November 2001, para. 55.
\textsuperscript{38} Al-Adsani, Waite and Kennedy v. Germany [GC], no. 26083/94, judgment, 18 February 1999; Taskin v Turkey, no. 46117/99, 10 November 2004.
(1) six with neither marriage nor registered partnership for same-sex couples: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.

(2) eight with registered partnership but not marriage for same-sex couples: Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy and Slovenia; and

(3) thirteen with marriage for same-sex couples: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.

22. Although the constitution of Romania, unlike the constitutional texts of Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia, contains a gender-neutral phrasing surrounding ‘family’, the Romanian Civil Code (Codul Civil) not only defines marriage as the union of a man and a woman, but also stipulates – in a rather atypical manner for continental civil codes – that “marriage between persons of the same sex shall be prohibited” and, even more specifically, “marriages between persons of the same sex entered into or contracted abroad by Romanian citizens or by foreigners shall not be recognised in Romania”.

23. Given that EU law is supreme over national law, all 27 Member States must be expected to comply with Coman and Others in practice, sooner or later. The issuance of a residence (and work) permit to the same-sex spouse of an EU citizen (or a returning national) removes the greatest legal obstacle to the exercise of the right to freedom of movement within the EU in this context.

24. Member States (of the Council of Europe and/or the European Union) have jurisdiction over civil rights granted to their citizens. Nevertheless, their legislation cannot condone illegal discrimination. On this point, much legislation has been brought before this Court by same-sex couples, mainly based on Article 8 (right to a family life) combined with Article 14 (non-discrimination) of the ECHR.

25. Quite early on, the ECtHR stated that “a difference in treatment is discriminatory under Article 14 if it has no objective and reasonable justification”, in other words if it does not pursue a “legitimate aim” or if there is no “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim to be realised”.

26. On this ground, the Court stated in Mata Estevez v. Spain that it was proportionate for Spain to exclude homosexual partners from social-security allowances for the surviving spouse, as the underlying reason for such exclusion was the protection of the bond of marriage. However, such an argument is less and less valid given that sexual orientation is a protected ground under the Convention and international human rights law, alongside broader acceptance of LGBTI persons throughout Europe.

27. Only two years after the Mata Estevez case, the Court ruled in Karner v. Austria that the Government’s position, which was based on the argument that the legislation in question

39 (Art. 259(1) and (2) of the Civil Code of Romania)
40 (Art. 227(1), (2) and (4) of the Civil Code of Romania)
41 For example, ECtHR, Oliari and others v. Italy, nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11; ECtHR, Norris v. Ireland (6/1987/129/180); ECtHR, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, No. 30141/04; ECtHR, Karner v. Austria, no. 40016/98; ECtHR, P.B. And J.S. V Austria, no. 18984/02.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 ECtHR, Karner v. Austria, no. 40016/98, 24 July 2003, para 41.
aimed to protect the bond of marriage, was not valid in itself.\textsuperscript{45} On this point, \textit{Karner} was a big step forward as it granted same-sex couples the right to succeed to a tenancy after the death of a companion when such a right exists for different-sex couples. As it is a patrimonial right, the Court considered there is no justification to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. It should be noted that Austrian legislation allowed unmarried different-sex partners to succeed.

28. Another important development in the Court’s jurisprudence was in the \textit{P.B. and J.S. case},\textsuperscript{46} in which the \textit{ECtHR} reaffirmed the principle that the notion of “family life” (Article 8 ECHR) applies to same-sex couples.\textsuperscript{47} In this case, the applicant sought an extension of his health and accident insurance to cover his companion, something considered by the Austrian Supreme Court as possible under a statutory insurance scheme for cohabiting partners, on the condition that they were different-sex couples. The \textit{ECtHR} considered this to be a violation of Article 8 combined with Article 14. The \textit{P.B. and J.S. case} thus recognised that same-sex partners had the right to benefit from a companion’s health insurance.

29. The \textit{ECtHR} has since developed a vast case law on same-sex couples’ access to a specific legal institution (e.g., same-sex civil unions or civil partnerships) that guarantees them the same level of legal protection that opposite-sex marriage affords to heterosexual couples.

30. The Court first indirectly recognised the right of same-sex couples to enter into a civil union by basing such recognition on the protection of the right not to be discriminated against. In \textit{Vallianatos and others v. Greece},\textsuperscript{48} concerning civil unions available only to different-sex couples, the Court found that the applicants’ same-sex relationships fell within the scope of “private life” and “family life”, just as the relationships of different-sex couples in the same situation would. It therefore considered that the applicants were in a comparable situation to different-sex couples regarding their need for legal recognition and protection of their relationships.\textsuperscript{49} Consequently, the Court was of the view that, by tacitly excluding same-sex couples from its scope, the law in question introduced a difference in treatment based on the sexual orientation of the persons concerned.\textsuperscript{50}

31. Later, in \textit{Oliari and others v. Italy},\textsuperscript{51} the Court finally recognised the right to enter into a civil union as such.\textsuperscript{52} In this case, the Court considered applications of three same-sex couples complaining that there was no alternative to marriage provided for in Italian law for same-sex couples. They appealed to the Court for recognition of the violation of Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. The Court once again acknowledged that same-sex couples are in need of legal recognition and protection of their relationships. It noted that the applicants in the case, who were unable to marry, had been unable to gain access to,

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid, para 42.
\textsuperscript{46} ECHR, P.B. And J.S. V Austria, no. 18984/02, 22 July 2010.
\textsuperscript{47} The Court notes that since 2001, when the decision in Mata Estevez was given, a rapid evolution of social attitudes towards same-sex couples has taken place in many Member States (para. 29) and “in view of this evolution the Court considers it artificial to maintain the view that, in contrast to different-sex couple, a same-sex couple cannot enjoy “family life” for the purposes of Article 8. Consequently, the relationship of the applicants, a cohabiting same-sex couple living in a stable de facto partnership, falls within the notion of “family life”, just as the relationship of a different-sex couple in the same situation would.” (para 30) Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} ECHR, Vallianatos and Others v. Greece, Nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, 7 November 2013, para. 73.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid, para. 81.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, para. 77.
\textsuperscript{51} ECHR, Oliari and others v. Italy, Nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 2015.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid, para 159.
and enjoy the protection of, a specific legal framework (such as that for civil unions) capable of providing them recognition of their status and guaranteeing them certain rights relevant to a couple in a stable and committed relationship. Consequently, it held that the Italian State had failed to guarantee certain basic needs that are fundamental to the regulation of a relationship between a couple in a stable and committed relationship, such as, *inter alia*, the mutual rights and obligations they have towards each other, including moral and material support, maintenance obligations and inheritance rights. Thus, in *Oliari and others v. Italy* the Court established a positive obligation upon the States to implement a general legal framework regulating same-sex relationships, regardless whether civil unions already exist for different-sex couples.

32. Ultimately, in the recent judgment of *Fedotova v. Russia*, the Court held that the Russian State had violated Article 8 ECHR by failing to provide same-sex couples with the opportunity to have their relationships formally acknowledged in the form of a marriage, or any other form. Three same-sex couples wished to get married in Russia. Their requests were inevitably rejected on the ground that the Russian Family Code (also endorsed by the Russian Constitutional Court) stated that marriage is a “voluntary union between a man and a woman”. They then brought the claim that it was impossible for them to enter marriage and thus obtain legal protection for their relationships. The Court clearly held that a State, failing to provide the opportunity for same-sex couples to have their same-sex relationships legally acknowledged, violates Article 8.

33. More specifically, concerning the issuance of residence permits to same-sex partners for family reunification purposes, the Court has handed down judgments in *Pajić v. Croatia* and *Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy*.

34. In *Pajic*, the applicant, a national of Bosnia and Herzegovina who was in a stable same-sex relationship with a woman living in Croatia, complained of having been discriminated against on the grounds of her sexual orientation when applying for a residence permit in Croatia. The Court ruled that the relevant domestic law operated to exclude same-sex couples from its scope, thereby introducing a difference in treatment based on the sexual orientation of the persons concerned. As the government had not shown that the difference in treatment was necessary to achieve a legitimate aim, or that it was justified by any other convincing reason, the ECtHR found that this exclusion violated Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14. The ECtHR held that a same-sex partnership implies a possibility of family reunification. In other words, if a Contracting Party complies with ECHR law, no recourse to EU law would be necessary at all.

35. In *Taddeucci and McCall*, the Court ruled on the Italian authorities’ refusal to issue a residence permit based on Italy’s domestic legislation’s failure to recognise unmarried same-sex partners as capable of being entitled to a residence permit on family grounds. The Court found that the circumstances of the applicants, an unmarried same-sex couple, could not be considered comparable to that of an unmarried heterosexual couple since the applicants could neither marry nor, at the time of their complaint, obtain any other form

---

53 Ibid, para 185, in comparison with Vallianatos and others v. Greece.
54 ECtHR, Fedotova v. Russia, App no. 40792/10, 13 July 2021.
56 ECtHR, Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, App no. 51362, 30 June 2016.
57 Ibid, para 83.
58 Ibid, paras. 74-77, 85.
of legal recognition of their situation in Italy. The Court, therefore, concluded that, in deciding to treat homosexual couples in the same way as heterosexual couples without any spousal status, Italy had breached the applicants’ right not to be subjected to discrimination based on sexual orientation in the enjoyment of their right to obtain a residence permit under Article 8 of the Convention, together with Article 14.\footnote{Supra note 56, paras 93-93.}

36. In essence, \textit{Taddeucci and McCall} strengthens the rights of same-sex couples in committed relationships who do not have access to marriage or civil union. \textit{Coman} ensures partial portability of the civil status of a couple who had already married. Consequently, the Interveners submit that the complementarity of these two rulings establish undeniable guarantees for same-sex couples moving across Europe.

37. These cases and the Court’s findings, echoed later in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) Resolution 2239 (2018) ‘Private and family life: achieving equality regardless of sexual orientation’,\footnote{Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), of Resolution 2239 (2018) ‘Private and family life: achieving equality regardless of sexual orientation’, adopted by PACE on 10 October 2018.} calling Member States to: “align their constitutional, legislative and regulatory provisions and policies with respect to same-sex partners with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in this field”.\footnote{Ibid, para 4.3} More specifically Member States should “ensure that same-sex partners have available to them a specific legal framework providing for the recognition and protection of their unions”\footnote{Ibid.} and “when dealing with applications for residence permits for the purposes of family reunification, ensure that, if same-sex couples are not able to marry, there is some other way for a foreign same-sex partner to qualify for a residence permit”.\footnote{Ibid, para 4.3.4.}

\textit{Conclusion}

38. In \textit{Coman}, the CJEU clarified that the gender-neutral framing of “spouse” in Article 2(2)(a) of the Citizenship Directive 2004/38 implies that married same-sex couples enjoy free movement rights equally to married heterosexual couples throughout the whole territory of the Union. It applies irrespective of how each particular Member State frames ‘family’ in its own legislation.

39. This consequently includes situations where a same-sex union remains unrecognised, in violation of ECHR law, as Article 8 of the Convention contains a positive obligation to this effect\footnote{See Oliari and others v Italy, supra note 51 and Pajic.v Croatia, supra note 55.} that is of a sufficiently general nature,\footnote{Orlandi and others v. Italy, nos. 26431/12; 26742/12; 44057/12 and 60088/12, 14 December 2017, para 210.} while also prohibiting differences based solely on sexual orientation.\footnote{See supra note 48, paras 77 and 92.}

40. However, to access effectively and concretely the right to family life under Article 8, acquiescing to Article 12 is de facto unavoidable.